Saturday, May 21, 2016

IF THEN IS TO BE CHANGE


IF THEN IS TO BE CHANGE: WORKING BEYOND THE AESTHETIC

“Literature is here undergoing an exquisite and fundamental crisis.”
--Stéphane Mallarmé (201)

            Mallarmé’s “Crisis of Verse” essay has become the meat of many a French intellectual’s career in philosophy or literature, and the latest of these is philosopher Jacques Rancière. His early work on the poet showed a literary flair, and his later work on the logic of “regimes” in art’s history makes pivotal use of the concerns of “Crisis” and of creative works like the prose poem “Conflict.” Crisis itself is one of the hinge concepts in that history. It also figures neatly in our art’s history of poetics. Some form of “crisis,” literary or social or philosophical, is often posited in poetics statements. Real social crisis can be found in the background of these statements from Whitman’s to Pound’s to Rich’s or Baraka’s and on to Silliman’s or Spahr’s or Yepez’. The ’08 economic crisis is very much with us here today through what it has revealed about our social structure, certainly, and right there in Brian’s call for poetics considerations that take it into account. All through this era, from Whitman to now, though, the positioning of art in relation to the social and political has put some sense of crisis into poetry itself.
            Rancière offers us a schema that helps begin effective considerations of this double crisis. He has proposed that we recognize a series of “regimes” ruling the standard sense of the arts. His logic reveals a dialectical sort of progression through crises into fresh forms and concepts of art-making and “art-taking”—the way that art gets appreciated or used in society. Mallarmé’s terms “fundamental” and “exquisite” actually say a lot about the kind of crisis that poetry once again faces as the arts move to the brink of change. The crisis that Mallarmé felt fits into Rancière’s schema of regimes, and through that concept of art’s history it makes sense in a way that speaks clearly to our crises today. It’s not too hard to see that one aesthetic framework basically extends from 1848 to 2008 and regulates, through what responses are seen as possible, what art can do “in the world.”
            Rancière’s schema clearly rises from European art history’s shifting relations to tribal, aristocratic, and bourgeois social structures. He proposes a series of “regimes,” purposely choosing a political term, that regulate and normalize how we think of the production of art and the functions of art produced in our societies. These show some applicability to other societies as well, though they probably got conceived with France in mind. It appears that Rancière began from the Aesthetic Regime, looking at how we operate now and have for some while.  What he says came before this appears to be derived from our standard notions of a noble tribal society and our sense of the aristocratic world that modern aesthetics revolted against to establish itself during the bourgeois revolutions. Even Rancière’s system is a kind of looking back at crises to explain the evolutions that he has proposed. He names an Ethical Regime, a Representative Regime, and our Aesthetic Regime in describing what art has worked its way through in the last few hundred years.
            The Ethical Regime was that regimen of producing and seeing art’s productions as iconic presentations of “the powers that be” in a society. These iconic images are there to educate the citizenry about what is of value: the heroes and gods of the good. This evolved into the Representative Regime of dramatic stories in art works that exhorted citizens to “seek the truth” played out from that iconic basis past its challenges and conflicts in being lived out. Both of these regimes were inherently conservative in the sense of propping up the political/social regimes that couched them. The arts would seem mostly to have served hierarchy and keeping things (and people) in their places.
            What came after them was a sort of “revolution” in the sense of breaking with this “global analogy” (as Rancière calls it) between social order and artistic rule. despite this shift, the Aesthetic Regime has had its own version of co-operation and co-optation within the socio-political regimen of the bourgeois world. That is our crisis, and the one that Mallarmé felt from an artist’s perspective if not also from that of a citizen. The Aesthetic Regime rose along with the bourgeois revolutions in France and elsewhere (see Eagleton). It allowed the emphasis on the individual that was focal for bourgeois values. The artist was moved to the fore, along with the perceptions and feelings that characterize what we now think of as “artistic vision.” In this new regime, the regimen called for paying attention to what this artist had seen and found a way to say.
            Rancière’s basic concept behind the schema of regimes is “the distribution of the sensible.” This idea focuses on how a regime of art or politics is all about its partitions among people as to who can see or say what’s going on. In the Aesthetic Regime, the myth is that “anyone” can be the artist and the audience must be seen as also including “anyone.” This is its democracy, but it must be constantly re-posited and there are ways that the focus on “artistic vision” fights against its openness. The double bind lies in how the Aesthetic Regime is based in an autonomy and open rule for art while this is counter-balanced with the play of forms of thought in the art world that may offer something new to the social world. There is a “backfire” mechanism firmly in place in this structure. The “separating out” that gives autonomy to art was created in the bourgeois “turning to” the individual as the locus of the realization (in both senses) of truths. We are expected to learn for ourselves, but we look to the visionaries for models. The art product and the artist herself are appreciated through a model of exemplarity taken originally from the Representative Regime and put to fresh aesthetic uses in sublimation of the person through Art and its work.
            Mallarmé’s crisis was in seeing himself as a poet stuck between all of these forces so that he had to declare the need to disappear from the work at the same time that he tried to make the work take on the demonstration of truths rising from its form and the exercise of its content. Ranciére has described that exercise as a kind of theatre where the artist and reader are engaged in and by a “shared performance” involving the “tracing of signs and the interpretation of those signs” that gives a materiality to the idea or feeling-perception in the work (Mute 140-142). This is where the new regime has its constitutive focus, in the feeling-perceptions (aisthesis) of the artist and the audience mutually making meaning through seeing what there is to read in things and saying how it feels to see it. This links with the old poiesis (forming) of the iconic Ethical Regime and the mimesis (imitation) of the dramatic Representative Regime and moves art away from its ancient rigors toward new forms of presentation. The “normative principle of inclusion” in the arts had rested upon “partitions between the representable and the unrepresentable” and “the distribution of resemblances according to principles of verisimilitude, appropriateness, or correspondence.” These formed “the distribution of the sensible,” in the sense of partitioning out what can be seen and said or done by any particular one, for the old regime. The Aesthetic Regime unfolded from these norms toward an inclusivity that made the partitions a little softer, though in giving the artist the power of vision through linkage with big-A Art, it opened a whole new can of worms. “In the aesthetic regime, artistic phenomena are identified by their adherence to a specific regime of the sensible, which is extricated from its ordinary connections and is inhabited by a heterogenous power.” Rancière identifies this as “the power of a thought that has become foreign to itself: a product identical with something not produced, knowledge transformed into non-knowledge, …, the intention of the unintentional, etc.” (Politics of Aesthetics 16-19).
            Mallarmé’s prose poem on a confrontation between a poet on vacation and a work-gang sent to the same spot to begin a new railway, “Conflict,” shows an example of this: the poet is not satisfied until he has worked through all of his feelings about these guys, and finally he can read them into a vision of their place in a shared world they may not even see. Though they made him reflect on his own work as work, the workers are tucked back in to a proper place in the vast ceremony of life’s energies as the “work-stoppage” of their after-labor drunkenness is read into a sublimating notion (Mallarmé 46). This is as far as Mallarmé could come, to a poet “racked with contradictory states” (44) wishing he could offer something “useful … in the general process of exchange” (45) and coming up with this displacing sublimation. His crisis is still ours as we strive to demonstrate truths and open up forms; the distances between writing and reading, words and things, the way it is and the way it oughta be, all link poet and audience in an impossible quest. Our much belovéd Bernadette Mayer seems to mock this in her 1983 piece “The Obfuscated Poem”:
            Poetry’s not a business; it was not her business or his to remake the world.

Holding to a course with the forbidden sublime, love of beauty originally obfuscates or sublimates to refine what is unclear to be unscrambled later from its perception of perfection by that continuing. Which is to change the world. As it does, which is why, nothing individually lost, there’s a difference to be told. (167)
She has out-Mallarméed Stéphane here, gathering phrases he might have used that we all have heard about poems and poesy, combining them consciously as he would to make syntax and interpretation a living part of understanding, and including the reader‘s role in this theatrical staging of ideas in words. Mayer’s playfulness reminds us that a space has to be opened between all that sublimity and our work-a-day world as poets. Rancière, in his discussions of Mallarmé, points out the “poetic space” where readers and writers apply their “ingenuity to a blank page, where a spectator ‘juxtaposes’ his inner theater with the spectacle on stage” and “the poem finds its place” in “the scene of its shared performance” (Mute 140). This is what the Aesthetic Regime has opened up, and it holds open possibilities for engagement that have only slowly been unfolded by us. We who may want to de-sublimate the poem have this space, this “stage” of “shared performance,” for staging our work to make a world of difference.
            We work where “things of art are things of thought” and the “existence of poetry is tied to this identity of contraries”: the immanence of thought in non-thought, and the “contradictory mode of a speech that speaks and keeps silent at the same time, that both knows and does not know what it is saying,” that seems to require bridges for “this gap between speech and what it says” (Aesthetic Unconscious 27-33).  We work with the sensuous space where writer and audience constitute the sensible out of these contradictions and gaps. We have been moved to embrace them in our labor and have become very subtle about it. We celebrate writing that embraces “that continuing” and claims “a difference to be told.”
            At then end of March in L.A., the AWP celebrated two fine poets who reach into our social consciousness: Rae Armantrout and Claudia Rankine. The front jacket flap blurb on my friend Rae’s 2011 book, Money Shot, claim that it presents “forensic” investigation of what’s “seen, what is hidden, and how … we know,” as well as “new ways to organize information” and “wonderfully stringent exploration of how deeply our experience of everyday life is embedded in capitalism”—all things we would be proud of being able to produce, I’d guess. Even with this Rancièrean investigation and post-Marxian explorative exposure, Money Shot still focuses on insight and its expression. We feel the impulse to “get it,” to absorb ourselves in the wisdom even if it gets worded a little snarkily. The poet is providing us with a vision even if it is in the form of critical thinking or an attempt to incite that in us by phrasings and juxtapositions. This is one of the challenges of our age, the late Aesthetic Regime, that goes back through Mallarmé’s “Crisis” and his drive to “eliminate the author” (208). He also, more fervently, wanted to eliminate chance—that sense of hazard in the encounter of the poet-personality, the language gap, and the meaningfulness of experience. His poem wanted to almost erase itself as it enacted the staging of its own gestation and its search for understanding. Money Shot also has among its back cover blurbs this grand claim relating to our seminar topic: “Pulitzer Prize-winning poet searches for new ways to understand the world in the wake of the Great Recession.” It nearly belongs in the book as a mock headline of our times. The Aesthetic Regime encourages us to search “for new ways to understand the world” and promises the possibility of change through our understanding, especially if it comes in the form of new forms for understanding. Poems like “This Is” and “Money Talks” (72-73) make good on the promise of “meta-epigrammatic attentiveness” and “wry empathies” in Rachel Blau DuPlessis’ cover blurb, but the book’s opening salvo (“Everything will be made new” 1) doesn’t necessarily come true as insight through epiphany still seems to shape the poems.
            Claudia Rankine’s Citizen risks a further dimension in its composition. She uses photographic “images” interspersed with her text in what seems at first a collaborative venture with the reader. However, seeing her read from this book two times in a row with the same explanations of how the images were selected to illustrate ideas or feelings in the text left me aware of a gap again here between writerly and readerly perception of this book. We were told that the photo on the second page of the text was fought for, and paid highly for, to accompany the narrative about not being seen with the sign for a “Jim Crow Rd” that calls up the distribution of the sensible in the “separate but equal” concept. Most other images in the book fit, and were selected as illustrations, in similar ways. This is not an integration with the reader in meaning-making but a positioning of the reader’s responsibility to “get it.” The book falls back upon “feelings” as the arena of contention (152-153 & 61). It hovers at the edge of looking at our usual answers and finding the questions hidden by them, as Jimmy Baldwin (I seem to recall) called upon us to do. If its urge is, as one cover blurb says, “to instruct us in the depth and variety of our participation in a narrative of race that we recount and reinstate, even when we speak as though it weren’t there,” then finding those questions in us is the next step. Otherwise, the book merely re-frames “answers,” and we of any color can pick them up and show them off as ours. The Aesthetic Regime leaves itself open to this dead-end, where we adoptingly bow to the wisdom and insight or equally dismiss it as “just what poets do.”
Some poets are now doing differently or even turning sharply against the aesthetical approach. Heriberto Yepez sternly warns us about the policing in the aesthetic approach. His language might even be borrowed from Rancière as he writes: “Art is a context in which the concept of police circulates among its participants.” The concept of “la police” is central to Rancière’s recognition of how standard partitions of the sensible are kept going among us by their quiet imposition as assumptions, and how true “politics” or political action is an assertion of dissent from any one of those. He writes about political action or its critical thinking as “dissensus” presented in what he calls a “montage of proofs: ‘logical’ arguments that are at the same time a way of reshaping the relationship between speech and its account” of what is wrong (Disagreement 40). These logical proofs take syllogistic form and require the positing of equality as the major premise wronged in a minor premise that describes the wrong-doing. For example: if all are equal but some women are being paid less for the same work, then we must either expose the myth of equality or enact a change to align the situation with its major truth. For artworks to do that, they must show the old account and open a new one. It is our accounting of the world that polices it. As Heriberto writes: “Every element of art polices the others,” and “Police is the ruling concept of art.” To assert that artworks “are part of the pacification apparatus” where “you are supposed to be the detective who finds additional meanings in art and never finds the police and the crime” is almost funny, but it leads him to an abrupt conclusion about art:
Art will not change. Art will not change art. Art will not change the world. The world needs to destroy art. The transformation of the world will involve the destruction of every form of art. Art’s self-destruction is not enough.
This is the opposite of where Rancière stops, holding onto a faith in the aesthetic to provide transformative insight. When Yepez hears Olson’s “What does not change / is the will to change,” he hears it as speaking the limit that the Aesthetic Regime will not surpass. It will not let go of “high-culture status and functions” nor the “respectability” of “dialogue” that “gives time for the killing machinery to continue.” Its function, Yepez says, “is to sabotage individual discontent and prevent violent collective explosions” just as the management of finance tries to do with the other crises. These hyperbolic statements fit the schema that Rancière has shown us, but one more element is evolving from it that could move us beyond this aesthetic impasse.
            The critical thinking that poets like Armantrout or Rankine are famous for provoking, or at least relaying, is now asking for the space it properly needs in the account of art’s work. Armantrout’s attentiveness and wit spark outside angles on what we’re used to seeing and hearing and how it composes a world and even a policing. Rankine gives us the interplay between text and image in our minds to shape the outside angle. It is this angle that must be kept from collapsing into mere learning for us readers. Art has built up from poiesis to integrate mimesis and aisthesis. So far, that fails to take it out of the hands of its deniers. It may effect learning for some, but many can quickly shove it aside or first enjoy it in dialogue and then set it aside. This liberal aesthetic effect is perfectly packageable. In it, nothing changes, especially not the “will to change” when art’s autonomy protects both itself and the world from effectuation of art’s thought. The evolution of a fourth element has begun to challenge that, though. That element is the critical thinking or questioning (noesis) that doubles our perspective.
            If we open art to the sort of double negative that Molière had so much fun with in The Bourgeois Gentleman, then it may find a way to keep the “shared performance” open and critical. This may allow “dissensus” a fresh opening, and help stage critical interventions through aisthesis, mimesis, and poiesis. To add noesis would change Rancière’s triad ruled by aesthetic feeling-perceptions into a Greimasian Square. It would form a structure of doubled oppositions between the objective and subjective aspects, between the conservative and progressive elements, and between the critical and the creative. When the bourgeois gentleman in Molière wants to understand the partition between poetry and prose, the tutor he has hired with his nouvelles richesses teaches him that poetry is not prose and prose is all that is not poetry. The serious laugh in that comes from the way that we account for things similarly all the time. The double negative of poetry being “not prose” and not “not poetry” is funny, but it may also show us the serious structure of art’s own partitions. Rancière mentions some contemporary art films that bring critical questioning alive in “shared performance” by focusing audience attention on partitions at different levels (Dissensus 149-151). He also asserts that such art uses signification in “a double effect: the readability of a political signification and a sensible or perceptual shock caused, conversely, by the uncanny, by that which resists signification” in order to move minds (Politics of Aesthetics 59). My nominee for an outstanding and provocative exemplar of this doubling is Sun Ra. His is not great poetry on the page, but his “act” is an intellectual doubling that escapes aesthetic measure because it can’t be pinned down. There are elements of his approach in the works of many of our contemporaries, perhaps because he simply sprinkled the world around him with his magic. When taunted on the streets about his appearance, he explained himself as “a myth not a person,” and he happily taught kids that they could see themselves this way too.
            Ra transformed himself out of Alabama poverty into the embodiment of a myth quite simply, by keeping the double negatives flowing even in blatant assertions of simple truths that “couldn’t possibly” be true. His times were full of the new science and science fiction of space travel. He simply “realized” that he was from Saturn, which he couldn’t be; right? Herman Blount took the legal name “le Sony’r Ra” and let himself be known as Sun Ra in an effort to blend Egyptian, pan-African, and outer space elements. He took to dressing like this:
(Ra, Space).
There were others using Space Age imagery or terms to fit their art into the times back then, but Ra built a huge “myth-science” offering a framework for his music and writings and stage performances. He gave us a chance to take him as a spaceman delivering messages of progress to Earthlings, as a social critic, and as a broadly engaged musician delivering everything from standard tunes to free-form sounds some might call “noise.” There is no way to nail him down at any one point except perhaps if you choose to dismiss him as “crazy,” but that kind of partitioning is exactly what all these aspects of his art are “talking about.” No matter which corner of the square you enter from, poetic or mimetic or aesthetic or the critical questioning of the noetic, you suddenly have more than just a little art appreciation can handle. Ra breaks up the policing of art by giving aisthesis over to support noesis. What he has formed (poiesis) is iconic and clearly mythical, what he has imitated (mimesis) is stories that have been told amongst us of gods and of slaves, what he brings across to us in terms of feelings and the sensual (aisthesis) we can “relate to,” and what he critiques (noesis) is our way of handling all of this and our urges to solidify him between partitions. He made sure to hyper-visible, contrarian, and fun.
            The humor in Ra’s work comes from the way he is “black” and “not black” and not “not black,” all while he is “playing music” and not playing “music” and yet not “not playing music,” and while he is being a “serious artist” and not a “serious” artist and not “not serious” entirely. We can join him in this unsettling dance with a little noesis added to our works in ways that double, and refuse to sort out, our “readability” in terms of “political signification” combined with “that which resists signification” in any simple terms. We can keep thought dancing between assigned positions, and not let it sit down in any one place too long. Ra’s praxis offers a way to hold both sides of literary effort in one set of gestures and thoughts. Rancière has observed that the “literature” concept born around 1800 has two contesting relations to the embodiments of meaning in our world: “On the one hand, literature reads signs written on bodies; on the other, it loosens bodies from the meanings people want them to take on” (Politics of Literature 44). These are the impulses we combine in our poetic writing. In fact, Rancière asserts that literature has become “a powerful machine … for the re-poeticization of life,” reading and de-mystifying it both (29). Ra’s practice goes further by intensifying these tendencies and putting them into our hands. He reads by loosening things up for our reading, and he makes it possible for us to loosen socially imposed meaning by reading in a “Yeah, but this too” kind of way. “Appearance and reality are not opposed,” writes Rancière in his explication of “The Method of Equality.” Together they may serve to construct “a new sensible world in the given one” and show “the knot that ties equality to inequality” in a way that can “enforce the presupposition of equality tied up with the presupposition of inequality and increase its power” (280). Ra works such a doubling by “enacting the disjunctive junction of story and argument, legitimization and delegitimization, equality and inequality” in the war of stories over boundaries and divisions in this life (281). Ra’s truth is more than true because it makes us chuckle: “What is this—some kind of joke?”
This doubling is part of “the self-defense of the surround” that Harney and Moten call for in The Undercommons (17), and part of that book’s important “reversion of terms against the common sense of things that we are used to” (Marshall, “The Under-Standing”). That is Rancière’s sort of work, redistributing the “sensible,” but here it moves beyond the far edge of the aesthetic. It becomes a key part of questioning the policing that we all actuate, and of breaking open the “exquisite and fundamental” question of who the police really are:
(Marshall, Every).


WORKS CITED


Armantrout, Rae. Money Shot. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2011.

Eagleton, Terry. The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.

Harney, Stefano & Fred Moten. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black

Study. New York: Minor Compositions, 2013.

Mallarmé, Stéphane. Divagations. Trans Barbara Johnson. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap/Harvard UP, 2007. Original 1897.

Marshall, Thomas C. Every Cop. 31 March 2012. Digital photograph.
http://postlanguage.blogspot.com/2012/03/trouble-in-mind-6.html

---. “The Under-Standing—a kind of review of two books by Fred Moten.” Galatea

Resurrects #23. 9 Dec 2014.

Mayer, Bernadette. “The Obfuscated Poem.” In Code of Signals: Recent Writings in

Poetics. Ed. Michael Palmer.  Io 30. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1983. 166-167.

Olson, Charles. “The Kingfishers.” In Archaeologist of Morning. Unpaginated. New
York: Cape Goliard, 1970.

Ra, Sun. Space is the Place. Still photo, taken on location for the film in Oakland, CA.
1972. In Sun Ra + Ayé Aton: Space, Interiors and Exteriors, 1972 Ed. John Corbett. Chicago: Corbett vs Dempsey, 2013.

Rancière, Jacques. The Aesthetic Unconscious. Trans. Debra Keates & James
Swenson. Cambridge: Polity, 2009. Rpt. 2010. Original 2001.

---. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Trans. Julie Rose. Minneapolis: U Minn,
1999. Original 1995.

---. Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. Ed. & Trans. Stephen Corcoran. London:
Bloomsbury, 2010. Rpt. 2013.

---. “The Method of Equality: An Answer to Some Questions.” “Afterword” in Jacques

Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics. Eds. Gabriel Rockhill and Philip Watts. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2009. 273-288.

---. Mute Speech: Literature, Critical Theory, and Politics. NY:
Columbia UP, 2011. Original 1998

---. The Politics of Aesthetics. Ed. & Trans. Gabriel Rockhill. London:
Bloomsbury, 2004. Rpt. 2013. Original 2000.

---. The Politics of Literature. Trans. Julie Rose. Cambridge: Polity, 2011. Original
2006.

Rankine, Claudia. Citizen: An American Lyric. Minneapolis: Graywolf, 2016.

Yepez, Heriberto. “Notes on art’s crap.” In Hache blog, under “Against the Police-
Concept of Art.” 23 June 2015. http://hyepez..blogspot.com/index.html#291136051933501245


Saturday, August 29, 2015

Aesthetic Revolutions: the Book

Rancière's claim is expanded upon in a book of academic essays entitled Aesthetic Revolutions. Editor Ales Erjavec claims that the arts are moved by tensions between representation and transformation and between an avant-garde of "pure art" and one that is "politicized"in seeking "transformation both of life itself and of the community." This turns a couple of Rancière's concepts into a simplification that misses the subtleties of the history and tensions proposed in his co-ordinated works. Erjavec calls the transformative force the "aesthetic avant-garde, putting the focus of aisthesis on the shifts art may bring to the feeling -perception of life and community. He quotes Rancière on this being a "redistribution of the sensible" (3). All well and good, but one element is missing from these revolutions. We must measure their success in terms of revolt, in and out of the art world; their failure may be in not creating an on-going space for critical thinking. They collapse life and community into the aesthetic.

Erjavec uses Rancière's sense of representational and aesthetic regimes in a way that twists their meaning out of place by bringing them to bear on a difference within the aesthetic regime. Erjavec's use of the long-standing term"aesthetic revolution" is also bent a bit to fit his needs. He makes claims for a general cultural effect of art, and even "cultural revolution," stemming from these so-called "revolutions" that shape "new timelines in the history of art" (5). This effect is seen mostly in the way we frame things and tell their story. However, people in the streets, the offices, and the neighborhoods generally see that as an academic by-way.

How do we measure the cultural effect of art works if not by looking carefully at the intersections of change, the State, and the culture at large? Erjavec included a provocative article by Professor Tyrus Miller of UC Santa Cruz that provides us with an occasion for investigating this idea using the fairly familiar sense we have of The Sixties. Miller's piece is called "Aesthetic Revolution in the United States during the 1960s."

It is easy to say that The Sixties changed our culture indelibly; it is less easy to show it (and how it may have happened) beyond question.

Saturday, August 22, 2015

Aesthetic Revolutions: Gathering at the Greimasian Square

Noesis helps create the double-doubled logical framework called a Greimasian Square, where no one element dominates but each helps give the others definition. The most famous examples of this thinking include Molière's joking about the definitions of poetry and prose in The Bourgeois Gentleman. There poetry is what it is by also being what prose is not and vice versa. One side of that square shows each of those alliances (+) while each corner is linked in opposition to the the pair on the other side:

poetry<---------------->prose
+                                       +
+                                       +
+                                       +
not-prose<----------->not-poetry

When I use poetry, I am using it as "not-prose" and also in opposition to "prose" and "not-poetry." The Gentleman's understanding brings out the humor in such logical alliances and differences.

With the four "-esises" as elements of art, we have a more complex set; however, it works on the same principles and even has potential for humor in it that can be used as a logical tool.

making / poiesis<---------->aesthesis / expressing
                  +                        +
(OBJECT) +                        +    (MIND)
                  +                        +
imitating / mimesis<------>noesis / critiquing

On the one side, we have the old alliance of poiesis and mimesis in what Rancière calls the "representative regime." These are the elements of an objective art that presents a world-view of myths and morés. On the other side are the elements of the subjective: aesthesis as the expression of feeling perception, and noesis as the critical thinking of the subject. On the other two sides, there are also linkages within the oppositions: poiesis and aesthesis are the artist's inner elements, chosen form and chosen expression; mimesis and noesis complementarily refer outwardly to the artist's world, imitating or critiquing its ways. Diagonally, we also have linking oppositions: poiesis and noesis as the bonded pair of making and critiquing, and aestheis and mimesis bonded as the extremes of self-expression and world-imitation where they temper each other.

We recognize this last bonded opposition as the dialectic that keeps artists in "the aesthetic regime" from merely returning to the representative or merely fully expressing their own feeling perception. We can recognize in the other bond the call to use shaping or form in conjunction with critical thinking (and humor, as in Molière, to keep the art from settling in its shapes and to keep it reaching beyond mere critique that might be closed down into idées reçues only ever temporarily new. It is the introduction of full focus on this interplay between elements in the form and content of an artwork that allows that work to both deliver on its promise of engagement and to keep its autonomously creative distance by using those doubled tensions.

In Rancière's simple abstract history, we see how societies have created representations of their "known" world by shaping works (poiesis) in conformation to mimesis of one sort or another. The "art" there is in the balance between form and imitation. Aesthetic art arose from that practice through the artist's position in the tension between those two basic elements. It added a third that created a more dynamic interplay between the experience of feeling perception brought to the work by the artist and how the artist used poiesis and mimesis to deliver it. For the audience also, an experience of feeling perception came to be the heart of the work. There would be, in that feeling perception, some critique of the standards of poiesis and mimesis; the field of aesthetics certainly included that kind of education through the work and its reception. However, this element was doomed to be enfolded in feeling-perception and generally identified with an individual or small group. This "matter of taste" then is played right back into the bourgeois world of opinion and other doxa. In that world, heterodoxy only proves orthodoxy's dominance. Aesthetics are anyone's game there, orthodox or not. Everywhere that a seemingly new aesthetics or poetics might arise, it would threaten to change the old and then, at best, the new would shift into being the new old or, as usual, the new would become "alternative" and the old would still sell from another bin in the aesthetical shop. Rancière's claims on behalf of an aesthtics that hovers or oscillates between autonomy and engagement leaves us stuck in this place.


Wednesday, July 1, 2015

Why Rancière and Beyond

Two threads twist through Jacques Rancière's work so far: a Western political history of public consensus and dissensus with "perception management" and "policing policy" at its heart; and a history of Euro-American aesthetics that looks back to see a pre-history centered in public ethics that unfolds into the regime of classic representative arts which then unfolds further into our modern "aesthetic regime." Our current place in these histories is a kind of concurrence, visible in Rancière's theory and in the major modes and concerns of contemporary life and art. It is this hinge-point of politics and art that Rancière helps to focus for us; it also helps us see through his claims and beyond.

As we puzzle over how to move forward politically and over the function or place of the aesthetic in doing so, we meet a world we are helping to build through our aesthetic sense. This conundrum has its basis in the way that political frameworks employ a vision that Rancière has rightly named as an aesthetic. He stays right there and urges the continued application of artistic visions as agents of revelation and change. However, if we look closely enough, we can see where his framework has begun to unfold into a larger and stronger one right here at the crossroads of those political and aesthetic histories that he has described. We have already begun to create the next regime even while Rancière is defending his theory of a world where dissensus enters through a feeling perception. His argument for this power of the aesthetic is based on showing how the aesthetic regime was built as a freeing framework within the representative regime. That libertatory quality focuses on feeling perception shared through art works and other visions. The strength of this is certainly its democratic approach to individual visions, but we have by now seen that "democracy" can be a word for policing and self-policing both in terms of "perception management" and through public policy. Rancière's vision can allow us to see the next shift already happening among us in defense against policy and policing.

In Aesthetics and its Discontents (2009) / Malaise dans l'esthetique (2004),  he made an effort to define our aesthetic history simply in terms of three classical Greek words: poeisis, mimesis,  and aesthesis (7). The shaping of a work (poiesis) to reflect elements of a known world (mimesis) was broken open through the inclusion of feeling perception and its transfer through artistic vision (aesthesis). "Aesthetics is not a discipline," he says, but "a specific regime for the identification of art" that he calls "a new historicity" that constitutes an "undifferentiated public to replace the designated addressees of representative works" (i.e. works in the style of the old representative regime) (8-9). This "public" is also the "public" of "public policy." And within this framework a new focus is placed on individual response within that undifferentiated mass. Art is now defined "less according to criteria of 'ways of doing,' and more in terms of 'ways of sensible being'" as it forms a fresh "challenge to thought" (10-11). We now would have a "paradoxical sensorium that henceforth made it possible to define the things of art" through "the opposition between pure voluntary activity and pure passivity" (12). This complex paradox is further complicated by the way "that a 'human' nature is always simultaneously a 'social' nature" and how the new regime suspended the old "rules by which human nature is accorded with social nature" (i.e. social class) (13-14).

These tensions between the individual and the mass, the activities of art-making and consuming, and the concepts of human nature and social class, all are developed in the aesthetic regime to become parts of its focus. As a new "distribution of the sensible," the aesthetic regime allows us to see and "work with" what we "work in" as a world; i.e. it allows critical stances. Art "is political ... because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and the manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space" (23). What's at "stake here does not only concern those objects that fall within the sphere of art, but also the ways in which, today, our world is given to perceiving itself and in which the powers that be assert their legitimacy" (15).  This comes through the tension between, on the one hand, the autonomies of the arts and individuals and, on the other, the sense of the common(s) through which these autonomies are shaped. (Harney and Moten's "undercommons" concept has a place in the critique being made here, but just staying within Rancière's framework can unfold in that direction.) The paradox of the aesthetic regime lies in its role "in constituting forms of common life" while reserving an autonomy for its own forms, like "the silent space of the museum in which the solitude and the passivity of passers-by encounters the solitude and passivity of artworks" (26). Aesthetics promotes a new "sensorium" (29) in which the ethical and representative aspects of art's work are subsumed under the suspension of work in that relatively idle moment of appreciation (30-31). Rancière claims this as a "suspension of the supremacy of form over matter and of activity over passivity" in "a revolution of sensible existence itself and no longer only of the forms of State" (32). It changes the state of being instead.

There are two measures to be taken here if we would like to see our state of being and that ways that the State itself finds part of its being in art: one would view this claim up against Terry Eagleton's rather larger claims about The Ideology of the Aesthetic and its way of subsuming such suspensions into its mechanisms of policing and policy, and the other would look at some prominent current artistic claims and their place in assisting the work of realpolitik in our time. First, though, a sharper look at Rancière's concepts is necessary as a groundwork. He has placed his theory in a rather tentative position among those already out there.

To make "the autonomy of a form of sensory experience" into "the germ of a new humanity, of a new form of individual and collective life" (32) looks a lot like a reversion to Romanticism and a hovering at a certain point in political and aesthetic history. Rancière claims it instead as a progressive re-reading of Modernism's stalemate by demonstrating "no conflict between purity and politicization" in this aesthetic "metapolitics" (33). It is at this point in his argument, though, that he reveals the fundamental Romantic paradox in the aesthetic regime: the art work is whole in itself but fleeting in its public moment (34). This reveals "a contradiction that is originary and unceasingly at work" in the aesthetic regime. The "promise of emancipation" is suspended as well, at the edge of "the elimination of art as a separate reality, its transformation into a form of life" (36). Rancière wants to leave us hanging between the contraries of "a type of art that makes politics by eliminating itself as art and a type of art that is political on the proviso that it retains its purity, avoiding all forms of political intervention" (40). He puts this tension under the name of "Adorno's aesthetics," describing an effort to see art as resisting " a two-fold threat: from its transformation into a metapolitical act and from its radical separation from the forms of aestheticized commodities and of the administered world" (40). This makes for an art that is looking two ways at once in order to be resistant. For Rancière, "the metapolitics of the resistant form tends to oscillate between two positions." One is "the struggle to preserve the material difference of art from all the worldly affairs that compromise it." The other is "the ethical task of bearing witness," which he sees as "cancelling out ... both art and politics" (43).

For Rancière, the trick is to avoid establishing a "sublime" position in the sense of "a force that exceeds" the heart of the art's effort (19) or stands as "an irreducible gap between the idea and the sensible" (20) or a force meant to "keep the two equally at a distance in "a new modesty" about art's capacity to transform the world" and "its claims about the singularity of its obects" (21). The malaise in our aesthetic sense may be more fundamental than just keeping the concept of the sublime at bay. For Rancière himself, there is a fundamental tension in the aesthetic regime--its regimen of attempting "to construct new forms of life in common" (44) through "a way of redisposing the objects and images that comprise the common world as it is already given" (21), while at the same time offering "the resistance of its form to every transformation into a form of life. This is done by holding aesthetic experience of "art" at a distance from that of any other aistheton. This regimen "threatens the aesthetic regime itself," he admits, even as he claims that it is also "what makes it function" (44). This tension, including that "threat" or risk, helps keep our aesthetic sensibilities moving between promise and compromise. This keeps art both somewhat effective and somewhat sublime.

That combination has given us art as we have it, under what Rancière calls "the aesthetic regime" as he provides a general abstract history of its development. How we got to this regimen of relying on an oscillating aesthetic is figured differently by Terry Eagleton. Eagleton's much more detailed exposition of an ideology built with and into the aesthetic approach is very fully historical. It begins with a historically based discussion of social construction at work in the mutual interplay between the mindsets of art and politics. In it, we see the establishment and development of The Aesthetic as a kind of institution like The Bank, The Stock Exchange, or Parliament (Eagleton 31). The bourgeois revolution that opened the space for all of these institutions created "the public sphere" where a certain kind of "social harmony registers itself on our senses, imprints itself  on our sensibilities" (36-37). Eagleton's chapter on this period in Europe, the late 17th into the early 18th century, is called "The Law of the Heart." It explains how bourgeois democracy used this new vision to implant a new social bond. Eagleton explains how "the aesthetic" means "introjection of abstract resason by the life of the senses" (42). Eagleton sharply insists that "in the aesthetic it is as though it is we who freely fashion the laws to which we subject ourselves" (43). This established the ideal that has become reactionary in our time (60). It works both ways, for us and against us, even without coercions from anywhere except our "sympathies." We police ourselves by it.

Eagleton summarizes a very important dialectical concept for us:
          The very emergence of the aesthetic marks in this sense a certain crisis of traditional reason,   and a potentially liberating or utopian trend of thought. By the end of the eighteenth century, such appeals to feeling will have become identified as dangerously radical. There is in the aesthetic an ideal of compassionate community, of altruism and natural affection, which along with a faith in the self-delighting individual represents an affront to ruling class rationalism. On the other hand, it might be claimed that such a movement comes eventually to represent a devastating loss for the political left. (60)
This loss is written into the structure of a thought that compromises its every promise always already from the start. Karl Marx, in both Eagleton's book and Rancière's book on art's discontents, is seen as a sort of political aesthetician who is trying to help us move into position to break the deadlock of the bourgeois hold on our aesthetics. Rancière sums up Marx's claim for us as the possibility of "aesthetic man: namely, productive man, the one who at once produces the objects and the social relations in which they are produced" (38) in a society that can finally "render ideas sensible" (37). Eagleton goes strangely further, taking Marx all the way back before his time to be a new kind of Shaftesbury, through whom the old emerging bourgeois aesthetic might speak again with some sense of revolution. He sums up that stance from Marx/Shaftesbury as saying: "To live well is to live in the free, many-sided realization of one's capacities, in reciprocal interaction with the similar self-expression of others" (226). This is the bourgeois dream, and it has had a troubling history. "We have seen," Eagleton reminds us, "some of the difficulties of this doctrine; but it remains the single most creative aspect of the aesthetic tradition" (226). In the common life, Marx would have us find "that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom" as he expressed it in Das Kapital. Eagleton uses this quote to turn back toward art: "If art matters, it is as a type of that which has its end entirely in itself, and this is most politically charged in its autonomy" (226).

This sounds very much like Rancière's two extreme for the aesthetic dialectic: autonomous art's forms and art's transformation into common life. Eagleton echoes Rancière's emphasis on the risks of impossibility at either extreme as he adds a caution to his assessment of Marx's aesthetic framework. Eagleton's chapter on "The Marxist Sublime" stops to remind us that Marx did not dive into the full aestheticization that would claim full autonomy or instant transformation. His analysis of "what conditions are necessary" to open the possibility of such happiness requires first the work of thought.
Eagleton wraps it up for us by focusing on "contradictions" and unlocking the closed loop between the impossibilities:
     That final aestheticization of human existence which we call communism cannot be prematurely anticipated by a reason which surrenders itself wholly to the ludic and poetic, to image and intuition. Instead, a rigorously analytical rationality is needed, to help unlock the contradictions which prevent us from attaining the condition in which instrumentalism may lose its unwelcome dominance. It may well be that in some future social order theory, instrumental thought, calculative reason will no longer play a central role in human life, but will have been transformed out of recognition. To prefigure such an order now, by (for example) the deconstruction of theory and poetry, may thus be a valuable proleptic gesture. But if an aesthetic experience is to be achieved for all, thought in general must not be prematurely aestheticized. (227)

The process requires critical thinking. This is where the aesthetic regime starts to unfold into something at least slightly "post-aesthetic." It still incorporates the aesthetic; it does not leave behind that double-bind of impossibilities. However, there was "always already" an urge toward critical thinking there in the aesthetic stance. Focus on that element may only seem to make this simply obvious; it could possibly just leave us standing with Rancière, claiming that aesthetics still has this area covered. The difference, though, could come right where Marx suggested it would: in the recognition of a fresh critical element that would "unlock the contradictions which prevent us from attaining the condition in which instrumentalism may lose its unwelcome dominance." Noesis, taken with aestheis poesis, and mimesis, is the fourth corner that sets up the dialectical tensions between the instrumentalities in each element. As part of a Greimasian Square, it can be looked upon as working with each of the others in cooperations and negations that both emphasize and undercut those instrumentalities. Nothing is left simply doing what it's supposed to; each effort has a delightful duplicity.

Tuesday, May 26, 2015

Je ne suis pas en Place

Vanessa Place's twittering of bits of Gone with the Wind has had many claims made for it, and now of course against it. Her own claims, those re-iterated by her supporters, are noble but trapped within what white French philosopher Jacques Ranciere calls "the aesthetic regime."

The work and the discussion about it provide an occasion for asking ourselves about our aesthetics: what do they bring us, and how can we escape their traps?

If we listen to Place's explanations, we read that she feels she is fighting racism with her work. Rich Smith, at thestranger.com, summarized her Facebook response to the controversy as having "two big thoughts. Thought #1: She believes she is participating in the fight against white supremacy by initiating a copyright dispute between herself, Mitchell's estate, and the state. Thought #2: She believes white people need to write about race because their silence on the matter suggests complicity with racism and also is an exercise of their privileged position in society." He then interviewed her and drew out much the same two thoughts. Her most provocative point was paraphrased as an assertion that "her use of racist imagery is 'vomit' induced by the poison of white supremacy."

The concept, then, in this conceptual poetry is that the legal rights to repeat Mitchell's text are the artistic and practical ground for fighting its "appreciation"--and a place to raise issues about the privilege of silent complicity. For all the ways in which it seems to reach betyond the simply or naively artful, Place's project is still solidly based in a concept of art that uses the aesthetic privilege to sneak into other realms and remain untouched by their realities. The problem of aesthetic distance undercuts her work's effectiveness.

A simple working definition of the world of the arts as we know it these days has been offered in the writings of Jacques Ranciere, a theorist of aesthetics and politics and their inter-relation. Its elegant simplicity helps make it a working basis for any approach to the social construction and political implications of our arts. Ranciere describes them on a historical basis, moving from what he calls "the representative regime" into "the aesthetic regime" and showing the new freedoms and possibilities created in the addition of the aesthetic concept. His concept of "regime" refers to the way that a certain mind-set rules among us. First, for Ranciere, it was the mind-set in a regime of politivcs and the way this framework of thinking supported a kind of mutual quiet policing in a society as to what could be possible in their social contract. After describing this kind of aesthetic of political tastes, he turned his focus around and looked at the politics of aesthetics.

There, he defined the mind-set that rules and polices our sense of the arts by using three classic Greek terms: poesis or making, mimesis or imitating, and aesthesis or feeling experience. It is easy enough to follow him in seeing how these elements show a particular history in our arts. From the kind of "making" that followed a regime of "imitating" models of the traditional world (gods & myths & saints & such--including aristocracy and its supporting castes), we moved through new self-awarenesses into adding the force of the artist's own experience and vision of the possible. This aesthetic (as it now could be called) accompanied the rise of the bourgeoisie as it appeared to make rioom for individual achievement and taste. Of course, this quality of individuality was part of the new aesthetic of (bourgeois) politics as much as of the political possibilities of aesthetics in the arts.

Ranciere shows how this opened a social force for the arts that had been latent in "the representative regime," partly in the multiple forms of making and the variety of aesthetics they made possible and partl in this new place for the artist. There could now be seen, in "the aesthetic regime," makings of various sorts that used imitation of life to express a feeling experience and impress it upon the audience. The audience could develop or adopt tastes, and the artists could express themselves toward or within these aesthetic possibilities. Ranciere has provided this rather simple model and defended its libertatory potential; there is a democracy and a productive anarchy within it, and that is what the art world ostensibly celebrates and encourages.

This aesthetic framework for the production/appreciation of the arts and artists creates its own further development and demise. Its contradiction of "the representative regime" remains its avant garde evren as its material contradictions begin to create the conditions for a new necessary advance. What makes this new advance necessary is both the internal dialectic of the forms multiplying in the aesthetic regime and the outer dialectic of the bourgeois social foprms, the "progress" through forms of competitive capital and its -isms. The influence of these social forms is neither simply outside nor inside the arts. Ranciere has described this well by showing that politics has a sort of an aesthetic of its own that is necessary to it. The political world's way of envisioning or policing itself is not a simply re-ifiable "thing." It is part of a conceptual "cloud," a noos-sphere, that also includes the regime of the arts. Ranciere gives us that much, but it is easy enough to see where it goes from there. The arts, having put the artist's sensibility in the driver's seat, are now open to the social awareness of the artist. For Ranciere, this fits roughly inside the aesthetic regime and makes him declare its adequacy. However, what emerges from the aesthetic regime is a set of relations that now includes a noetic dimension that was, of course, there all along.

To add noesis, critical thinking, to the other three clasic Greek terms forms what has come to be called a "Greimasian Square" of logic. The pair of paired opposites here is more complex than the funny one Moliere used in the mock education of his Bourgeois Gentleman, goofing over how poetry is that which is not prose and vice versa. Here we have poesis and mimesis across the top line and aesthesis and noesis as the bottom pair, with tensions between the relatively inner (poesis & aesthesis) and outer (mimesis & noesis) oriented pairs and between other aspects represented by these four. These include making and sensing, sensing and thinking, critiquing and imitating, imitating and creating, critiquing and creating, and sensing and imitating. The work of noesis is awareness of the tensions in each pair and in the work's relations to the world in which it is shaped.

Noesis rises from the awareness of these tensions across the square and how they help shape the work, just as aesthesis arose from the tension between making and imitating out of the fact of there being an artist involved. The making of an imitation of any of the culture's myths or icons (stories or images) required a maker and this artist  position puts the spin on things that we recognize as style and appreciate aesthetically. "Aesthetics" is our term for both this reception of the work and for the artist's inner process of turning feeling perception into a work. The artist's vision can be almost immediately seen as a comment on the world in which the work is created. That angle has been included in aesthetics so far, and that is where Ranciere (and most everyone) appears to have left it; however, his schema beginning in the aesthetics of politics and moving into the politics of aesthetics puts an emphasis on that critical commentary. The artist, the critic, the theorist, and the audience participate in the creation and extension or obliteration of this critical element. Ranciere's full contribution to what Terry Eagleton called The Ideology of the Aesthetic in his lengthy detailed study is not completely realized until we pull noesis out to form the fourth corner of the square. In that famous locution of French philosophy, it was "always already" there. We see this best once we have given it a name and a focus that exposes this aspect of what the artist, critic, theorist, and audience do.

The artist who wants to artfully move the art forward must not just participate in the aesthetics of the art but also critique them to some extent, at least by showing an awareness of what has been done and what could be carried further in some direction. This awareness is not parody; it is not mere snarkiness. It is not merely aesthetic; noesis is related to aesthesis as its outward-reaching dimension, and also to poesis and mimesis in this outward way. As mimesis is the dimension of relation to outward "things," noesis is a relation to the social "world" and brings that relation to the other elements in a critical way. The artist that moves the art forward also exposes the art's social function, its politics. This is drawn out from what is "imitated," how thw rok is shaped, and what kind of feeling perception is delivered.

The critic who can lift these aspects from the work may do so in any terms, but the critic guided by the theorist who has brought noesis into focus will offer audiences guidance in recognizing this critical social dimension of the work. Audiences, though, are rarely guided by intelligent critique; theirs is more a position of playing out the effect of the four coordinated elements and demonstrating the social value of the work framed by the theorist and interpreted by the critic. The artist's vision my reach the audience and move them or not. Social resistance to it may manifest itself in any or all of the other three positions, but the concept of noesis will reveal that. Where noesis is given full consideration, even the power of the old regime to blunt the work's effect on the audience is changed. It can now be described critically, and the work can be measured in its own critical power to be not just a vision based in feeling perception or a likely imitation of things or a well-wrought repository. The work the work does in the world can be a focus.

If we apply this to a work that has been bashed and defended a lot lately, like Vanessa Place's GWTW tweets, we may see how the concept works practically. As a long series of tweets repeating the text of Mitchell's famous novel, this work imitates the book in Twitter format. This work takes the shape of tweets, a contemporary social media form of text in brief bursts accompanied by a chosen user avatar image. Place uses a picture of Hattie McDaniel as the "mammy" in the film of GWTW. The perception from which the work stems seems to be the "minstrelsy" that Place has said she sees in GWTW and its racism, a white imitation of black culture within the telling of the "tragedy" of the Old South. The work's attempt to critique this is side-tracked, though, in the odd little project, described elsewhere by Place, of attempting to instigate a lawsuit over "rights" to the text and its iterations. Rights are certainly at issue in the larger picture here, but this is where the work fails both aesthetically and noetically.

To read, bit by bit, the "same" but ostensibly different book, now fragmented and re-framed with that avatar repeatedly appearing, leaves us short of Place's goals. Its mimesis is that re-iteration. Its poesis is that re-framing in the contemporary social media format. Its aesthesis is less clear and simple, though it makes some sense after you hear her explanations given elsewhere. The "minstrelsy" or minstrel show idea is deeply accurate to American history. My own white family participated in minstrel shows in Union County, Ohio, even though earlier generations had run underground railroad stations. That mockery of black culture in the 1930s certainly is present in Mitchell's 1936 text and in Hattie McDaniel's 1939 film role. Place's displacement of the text into a new framework fails to put focus on this perception of minstrelsy. The "black face" of the avatar may suggest it, but her iteration does little to re-frame the text and provide or even suggest critical perspective on its racisms. Place's mimesis and poesis leave that aesthesis dulled.The noetic angle is buried.

Place has elsewhere stated that this whole project has, as one of its goals, the purpose of provoking Mitchell's estate into a lawsuit over the copyright to Mitchell's text. There may be some noetic value in that, but it is not made clear by the work. It also seems a fantasy because the whole thing may be ignored and probably will. That likelihood leaves Place's work in the position of the bad comedian who "not only tells 'em, he explains 'em"--the worst failure of a joke or anecdote with an audience. No one is moved aesthetically or noetically, and the teller is left standing there not quite in touch with anyone's life or head but her own.

So, there are both political and aesthetic failures in Place's work. An expanded framework of four elements, beyond the aesthetic trio, shows us this pretty clearly. We can see that Place's poesis uses a mimesis to underline an aesthesis that places her own perception and experience of Mitchell's book and its "appreciation" (in the linked economic and aesthetic senses) in a suspension (in the linked chemical and artistic senses) where it can be looked at, while the real situation goes on in the streets and the courts and the copshops. A noesis that focuses on the tension between the book and the real is missing from the work. Once it is supplied by critical thinking of our own,  or just by a reminder of real hurt or real work, noesis shows where this Twitter work has trapped itself.

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The Wikipedia article on Hattie McDaniel brings out a series of provocative tensions represented in the life and work of this daughter of former slaves; it includes her many achievements, the controversies over some of them, and the 2010 quiet tribute paid to her at the Oscars by Mo'Nique's dress and gardenias. Celebrate if you dare by reading it, and by letting Vanessa go back to her place among those who may have tried but couldn't quite see what living is like for others.